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The concept of unchecked power is a notion antithetical to our system of
democracy. The Constitution's design withholds unreviewable power from
any single branch of government and allows the judicial, legislative, and ex-
ecutive branches to share in the balance of authority.' A familiar equation
of our democratic government, the system of checks and balances serves to
1. It has been said that the American system is built upon a belief in weak government.
M. FOROSCH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 12 n.25 (1969). The separation of powers doctrine il-
lustrates this belief and the Constitution impliedly embodies its principles by creating, in three
separate articles, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial branches. To each branch there
is granted the entirety of its power. "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; "The executive Power shall be vested in a President." U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. This division, however, does not mean that each
branch is to receive an equal third of the governing authority. The doctrine of separation of
powers does not require each branch to
be kept wholly and entirely separate and distinct, and have no common link of con-
nection or dependence, the one upon the other, in the slightest degree. The true
meaning is, that the whole power of one of these departments should not be exercised
by the same hands which possess the whole power of either of the other departments
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 525 (1891).
See Trustees of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 191 N.Y. 123, 132,
83 N.E. 693, 695 (1908).
The constitutional plan created this tripartite form of government with each branch sharing
in the governing authority of the other. The post-revolutionary draftsmen of the Constitution
were all too familiar with the hardships inflicted upon citizenry by an unaccountable governing
authority. "The delegates to the 1787 Convention were fearful of providing overmuch of
power to any one body, for in their own lifetimes they had felt the effects of this monolithic
despotism aboard and at home." M. FOROSCH, supra at 12. The goal of the Convention was
to devise an impartial government. This goal was sized up in the oft-quoted phrase attributed
to John Adams as draftsman of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, "[t]o the end it may
be a government of laws and not of men." MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 30.
As Justice Brandeis wrote, the separation of powers doctrine was adopted "not to promote
efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid fric-
tion, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental
powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy." Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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protect citizens from the injustice of power abused by governing authority.2
The Constitution charges the executive branch and its agencies with the
duty to assure "that the laws [are] faithfully executed.",3 Under common
law, all executive actions are subject to judicial review under the court's gen-
2. The need to check the use of the vast authority to govern was of tantamount concern
to the Framers of the Constitution.
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern
men, neither external nor internal controuls on government would be necessary. In
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great diffi-
culty lies in this: You must first enable the government to controul the governed;
and in the next place, oblige it to controul itself. A dependence on the people is no
doubt the primary controul on the government; but experience has taught mankind
the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
Rather than restraining each branch of government from intruding into the domain of the
others, the Framers' plan, by design, encouraged the constant interplay of branches. Permit-
ting one branch to check on another furthers the goal of limiting power centralized in one
department, one agency or, for that matter, one administrator. As Justice Jackson observed,
the Constitution's plan demands the close integration of the three branches in order to provide
a more workable government. "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure
liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable
government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but
reciprocity." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
The role of judicial review is crucial to the balance of separated powers. The system of
checks and balances is particularly dependent upon the role played by the courts. Executive
agency authority, in particular, is curtailed by the judiciary. By design, the courts were "to
serve as a check on the administrative branch of government-a check against excess of power
and abusive exercise of power in derogation of private right." AT'y GEN. COMM. ON AD-
MINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S.
Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1941).
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. See E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS
1787-1957 (4th rev. ed. 1957) (asserting the multidimensional power of the Chief Executive);
R. PARKER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A TEXT 15, 84-97 (1952) (evaluating the executive pow-
ers in the scheme of the separation of powers); Grundstein, Presidential Power, Administration
and Administrative Law, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 285 (1950) (discussing the evolving theories
of presidential power).
So charged, the chief executive is responsible for the faithful execution of laws "which are,
by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). In exercising his duty to faithfully execute, the Chief Executive is
subject to the control of the judiciary which, under the separation theory, is solely authorized
to define what is and what is not lawful, Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46
(1825), and what action will fall within and what will fall outside the executive branch's juris-
diction. See R. PARKER, supra at 110-12.
Still, the faithful execution of the laws necessarily affords a great degree of discretion to the
executive branch that escapes quantification. Administrative policy and political initiatives
generally escape judicial review until crystalized into a specific harm to an aggrieved citizen
who brings suit. The campaign promises of a particular administration are most easily imple-
mented through those decisions of the executive agencies that are discretionary in nature. The
agencies, in turn, are brought to court, lending credit to de Tocqueville's prescient observation
that "scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or
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1986] Presumption of Nonreviewability 1101
eral powers of equity. 4 It was not until the enactment of the Federal Admin-
istrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA or the Act)5 that a general statutory
later, into a judicial question" 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Brad-
ley's ed. 1945).
Yet, the exercise of discretion is certainly not limited to, nor solely characteristic of, the
executive branch administration. As a body, the Congress has complete "discretion" over
what laws to enact, when, and how. The judiciary, moreover, is often charged by the legisla-
ture with the duty to interpret statutory language so vague that any interpretation necessarily
confers wide discretion. See, e.g., United States v. New York Cent. R.R., 212 U.S. 509 (1909).
Historically, courts have also wrestled directly with outright policy questions. See, e.g.,
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 450, 451, 453-66, 569 (1793); Madison v. Ducktown
Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904); Simpson, Fifty Years of
American Equity, 50 HARV. L. REV. 171, 222-23 (1936).
4. One of the earliest expressions of the fundamental concept of judicial review in equity,
and in particular review of those matters of government, is found in Lord Coke's treatise
Institutes of the Laws of England. The legal jurisdiction of the Court of the Kings Bench, as
Coke described it, encompassed all acts of oppression, controversy or debate between persons.
As such, the infractions of the King's government against the governed were not immune from
review, sanction, and punishment by the courts.
[T]his court hath not only jurisdiction to correct errors in judiciall proceeding, but
other errors and misdemeanours extrajudiciall tending to the breach of the peace, or
oppression of the subjects, or raising of faction, controversy, debate, or any other
manner of misgovernment; so that no wrong or injury, either publick or private, can
be done, but that this shall be reformed or punished in one court or other by due
course of law.
4 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 71 (London ed. 1797).
5. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559,
701-706 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984)). The subject of lengthy debate, the APA was enacted after
more than 10 years of consideration. In it, Congress created the administrative courts, stan-
dardized administrative procedure among agencies, and provided for judicial review of all
agency actions. H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1195.
Brief perhaps to the point of oversimplification, the original Act was comprised of only
twelve sections. The first four sections outlined standards for agency rulemaking and dissemi-
nation of public information. Sections 5 through 8 standardized formats of agency adjudica-
tions, hearings, and decisionmaking on matters before the agency. Section 9 addressed the
general limitations of administrative power. Section 10 of the Act established the right of
judicial review for "[a]ny person suffering legal wrong because of ... agency action or ad-
versely affected or aggrieved by ... action within the meaning of... relevant statute." Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (APA) § 10(a), 60 Stat. 237, 243 (1946).
The APA was enacted in response to the growing need for uniform treatment of procedure
by different agencies. Its final form was the product of many previous legislative, executive,
and congressional attempts at formulating uniform rules for administrative procedures.
It would seem to require no argument to demonstrate that the administrative agen-
cies, exercising but a fraction of the judicial power may likewise operate under uni-
form rules of practice and procedure and that they may be required to remain within
the terms of the law as to the exercise of both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
power.
S. REP. No. 442, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1939), reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1195, 1196-97 (accompanying S. 915, the Walter-Logan bill, an earlier version of the
APA favorably reported to the Senate). The final bill was passed in response to the "wide-
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right to review agency actions existed at law.6 The APA codified the com-
mon law presumption that, in order to be constitutionally valid, all agency
actions must be subject to review by administrative and federal district
courts.7
spread demand for legislation to settle and regulate the field of Federal administrative law and
procedure." S. REP. No. 758, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1945), reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1195, 1204 (final report of the Senate Judiciary Committee on S.7, the
Senate version of the APA).
6. As originally enacted § 10(c) states: "Every agency action made reviewable by statute
and every final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in any court shall be
subject to judicial review." APA § 10(c), 60 Stat. 237, 243 (1946). The Act grants to the
courts broad powers of review to investigate and to review administrative agency actions:
So far as necessary to decision and where presented the reviewing court shall decide
all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of any agency action. It shall (A)
compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and (B) hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (1) arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law
APA § 10(e), 60 Stat. 237, 243 (1946).
Section 10 of the Act essentially records preexisting common law principles of availability,
timing, form, and scope of judicial review. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). Sec-
tion 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706, subtitled as scope of review, grants authority to the reviewing court
to review the entire record of the agency proceeding to ensure that the administrators complied
with relevant statutes. It also compels the court to hold unlawful any agency action that it
finds to be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
This section, which compels a court to investigate and determine whether there is an abuse
of discretion, has been said to exist in tension with the opening limitation of § 701 that exempts
from review those actions committed to agency discretion. Considerable debate has evolved on
this seeming contradiction between two oft-quoted authorities on the subject, Professors Ken-
neth C. Davis and Raoul Berger. Davis concludes that there can be no judicial review of some
agency abuses of discretion while Berger maintains that any abuse of discretion is reviewable.
See Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1965);
Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Reply to Professor Davis, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 783
(1966); Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Rejoinder to Professor Davis' "Final Word,"
114 U. PA. L. REV. 816 (1966); Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Sequel, 51 MINN. L.
REV. 601 (1967); Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965 (1969);
Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Final Word, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 814 (1966); Davis,
Administrative Arbitrariness-A Postscript, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 823 (1966); Davis, Administra-
tive Arbitrariness Is Not Always Reviewable, 51 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1967). See also Rogers, A
Fresh Look At Agency Discretion, 57 TUL. L. REV. 776, 787-92 (1983) (synthesizing the two
views on the question of unreviewability).
7. The rise of administrative law and its processes closely parallels the rapid develop-
ment of the United States from an 18th Century agrarian society into a large, complex, and
industrialized nation. The requirements of industry regulation necessitated specialization and
expertise. Despite the Constitution's tripartite design, the administrative agencies of the exec-
utive branch became the only forum capable of such specialization and able to provide con-
tinuity in regulatory policy. As the workload of the Congress increased and the nature of
regulation became more technical, agencies absorbed greater governing and rulemaking au-
thority. The judiciary branch, also burdened by its caseload, could not meet the growing de-
mands of regulation and was incapable of specialization. As a result, agencies were vested with
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greater legislative and adjudicative authority. P. WOLL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE INFOR-
MAL PROCESS 7-8 (1963).
In a 1916 speech, Elihu Root, the president of the American Bar Association observed that
the developing administrative process would necessitate a formal mechanism of restraint:
[T]he powers that are committed to these regulating agencies and which they must
have to do their work, carry with them great and dangerous opportunities of oppres-
sion and wrong. If we are to continue a government of limited powers these agencies
of regulation must themselves be regulated. The limits of their power over the citizen
must be fixed and determined. The rights of the citizen against them must be made
plain. A system of administrative law must be developed ....
Root, Address of the President, 41 REP. A.B.A. 356, 368 (1916).
As a necessary component of their charge, administrative agencies have been permitted
broad discretion in the exercise of their duties. Modern administrations could not function
without such latitude.
The volume of cases dealt with by administrative agencies is staggering. A regula-
tory agency like the Interstate Commerce Commission receives, analyzes, and files
thousands of rate schedules and disposes of thousands of applications to be allowed
to do or to be excused from doing various things, receives complaints, and conducts
investigations.
B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1.13, at 30 (2d ed. 1984).
With the rise of the regulatory state, the number of extrajudicial agency adjudications rap-
idly increased. At a meeting of the Federal Bar Association in 1931, Chief Justice Hughes
observed that "the distinctive development of our era" was the problem of "executive justice,
perhaps better styled administrative justice. A host of controversies as to provisional rights are
no longer decided in the courts." N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1931, at 18, col. 1.
Administrative adjudications that come before the courts constitute only a small fraction of
those dealt with by the agencies alone, and yet the courts' role is far from obsolete. The
judiciary's primary concern is that of ensuring that the administrative process protects the due
process rights of the litigants and preserves the elements of fundamental fairness. B.
SCHWARTZ, supra.
Administrative law is a body of judicial and legislative restrictions to preserve the elements
of fairness. In private litigation it is generally believed that both parties are of relatively equal
position and ability. This premise is not uncontroverted. Indeed, Critical Legal Studies (CLS)
posits the relative inequality of position and ability and condemns much of the judicial and
legal system as fraudulent. See, e.g., Gordan, New Developments in Legal Theory in THE POLI-
TICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, 281 (D. Kairys, ed. 1982). The scope of the CLS
critique is enormous and clearly falls beyond the realm of this Note. For an excellent intro-
duction to CLS, as well as to its detractors, see Critical Legal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 1-674 (1984).
Administrative law cases, obviously, involve federal agencies.
The situation is different in administrative law cases. Here the body politic has
stepped in; the private party is confronted not by another private person, but by an
agency of government, endowed with all the power, prestige, and resources enjoyed
by the possessor of sovereignty. The starting point is the basic inequality of the par-
ties. The goal of administrative law is to redress this inequality-to ensure that, so
far as possible, the individual and the state are placed on a plane of equality before
the bar of justice.
B. SCHWARTZ, supra at 29.
Courts have the burden of maintaining this goal of administrative law. In drafting the
APA's generous provisions for judicial review of all other agency actions, Congress created an
exception for agency discretion. Where precluded by the enabling legislation or committed to
its discretion by law, agency action is exempt from review. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1982). Heckler v.
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An agency's discretion to enforce its regulations,' however, is a source of
unreviewable authority. An agency decision not to investigate or to enforce
certain regulations against particular violators remains beyond the reach of
judicial scrutiny.9 Traditionally, this has been known as "prosecutorial dis-
cretion," a doctrine that allows criminal prosecutors to pick and to choose
the object of their prosecution in order to maximize the efficient distribution
of law enforcement resources.' ° However, this practice of criminal law has
never been formally accepted by administrative law courts and commenta-
tors.l" Federal courts were hesitant to tip the balance of power in favor of
the executive branch by granting agencies unreviewable discretion in their
enforcement priorities.
12
Chaney, 105 S. Ct. 1649 (1985), placed agency enforcement decisions outside the realm of
judicial review by construing this previously little used provision. See infra notes 123-53 and
accompanying text.
8. An agency is charged with the implementation and oversight of the rules and regula-
tions it promulgates pursuant to the authority delegated to it by the Congress. The enforce-
ment of these regulations, in order to assure compliance, is essentially the day to day task of
the agency. But the agency's enforcement capabilities are limited, vastly outnumbered by the
number of violations. The finite resources of an agency can only be deployed against a fraction
of the violators. The sheer volume of the enforcement caseload necessitates an element of
discretionary authority to determine which violations will and which will not be pursued.
Like the discretion of a criminal prosecutor to seek the maximum penalty or accept a plea
bargain, the agency is at liberty to accelerate or to restrain its enforcement efforts on a case by
case basis. As such, the enforcement discretion accorded criminal prosecutors and agencies
alike has come under stern criticism. While Attorney General, Mr. Justice Jackson observed
that in criminal proceedings: "The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputa-
tion than any other person in America. His discretion is tremendous .... he can choose his
defendants... a prosecutor stands a fair chance of finding at least a technical violation of some
act on the part of almost anyone." The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 18-19 (1940),
quoted in 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 2D, § 9:1, at 216 (1979).
The discretionary power of the agencies can and does lead to dissimilar treatment of the
same violations. As Professor Kenneth C. Davis has observed, the resulting system of enforce-
ment is somewhat less than equitable.
Discretionary power to enforce in varying degrees may mean that a tax official
squeezes out every drop of what one taxpayer owes but may overlook large deficien-
cies of another taxpayer. The Immigration Service may vigorously enforce against
one alien but may respond to a congressman's request for lenience toward another
alien whose problem is identical. A licensing agency may institute a revocation pro-
ceeding against one violator and let another go. A rate agency may push for a reduc-
tion of one utility but amiably agree with another through "continuing surveillance."
In each instance, the theory of the law is that equal protection is always required, but
the reality of the law over long periods-even centuries-may be not only denial of
equal protection but also lack of effective legal remedy for the denial of equal
protection.
2 K. DAVIS, supra § 9:1, at 217.






In Heckler v. Chaney, 3 the United States Supreme Court firmly estab-
lished the application of the prosecutorial discretion doctrine to administra-
tive law proceedings by denying review of agency enforcement decisions.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Rehnquist held an agency decision
not to investigate alleged statutory violations to be a valid exercise of an
agency's enforcement discretion, precluded from judicial review by section
701(a)(2) of the APA. 14
By removing the agency enforcement decision from judicial oversight,
Chaney undermines a critical pillar of agency authority. The decision stands
in contradistinction to the established presumption of the judicial reviewabil-
ity of agency rulemaking and adjudicative orders.
Chaney involved a petition to the Commissioner of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA)15 by eight inmates who were sentenced to death by
lethal injection under new state death penalty statutes. 6 Seeking FDA in-
vestigation and prevention of a method of execution that employed drugs not
approved for that purpose, 17 the inmates asserted that use of barbituates and
13. 105 S. Ct. 1649 (1985).
14. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1982) provides: "(a) This chapter applies, according to the provisions
thereof, except to the extent that--(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law." The Supreme Court concluded that "an agency's
decision not to take enforcement action should be presumed immune from judicial review
under § 701(a)(2). For good reasons, such a decision has traditionally been 'committed to
agency discretion,' and we believe that the Congress enacting the APA did not intend to alter
that tradition." Heckler v. Chaney, 105 S. Ct. at 1656. Whether or not there was such a
tradition and whether such was the true congressional intent is subject to debate. Compare 2
K. DAVIS, supra note 8, §§ 9:1-9:22. "Our basic system is one of discretionary power to dis-
criminate in making decisions to enforce or not to enforce, and typically the discretionary
power is not only uncontrolled by law but is even unguided by law. The uncontrolled and
unguided discretionary power to discriminate is in fact especially damaging to justice .
Id. § 9:1, at 220.
15. Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 1649 (1985).
16. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 43.14 (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1986) that
provides "[w]henever the sentence of death is pronounced against a convict, the sentence shall
be executed . . . by intraveneous injection of a substance or substances in a lethal quantity
sufficient to cause death and until such convict is dead." Similar statutes exist in other states.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-14-11 (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1014(A); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 10.95.180 (West Supp. 1986). Since 1977, states have begun adopting lethal
injection statutes as a means of human execution. The prisons in those states have not fully
implemented the lethal injection as a means of capital punishment and it was not until Decem-
ber 7, 1982 that the first condemned man was executed by lethal injection in Texas. 718 F.2d
at 1177.
17. The inmates specifically requested that the FDA take action in order to: (1) affix
warnings labels stating that the drugs were not approved for the purpose of human execution
to the boxes of the drugs involved; (2) send notice to the states' departments of correction that
the drugs were unapproved and should not be used for the purpose of human execution; (3)
place an article in the Drug Bulletin advising that the drugs were not effective as a means of
execution; (4) adopt a procedure for the seizure of the drugs from departments of corrections;
19861 1105
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paralytics for capital punishment violated both the "new drug"'" and "mis-
branding"' 9 provisions of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).2 °
Relying on his agency's "inherent enforcement discretion," the Commis-
sioner of the FDA declined to investigate the alleged violations.2
The inmates sought review of the FDA's decision not to take action by
filing suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.22
The petitioners alleged that the agency had acted arbitrarily and capriciously
in its refusal to bar execution by drugs not proven "safe and effective" for
that purpose.2 3 The District Court granted summary judgment and upheld
the FDA's refusal as a valid exercise of its enforcement discretion. 24 The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia vacated and
remanded the case for further proceedings to compel action by the FDA.25
Citing with approval the trend toward greater judicial review of all agency
actions, 26 the District of Columbia Circuit granted review and found the
and (5) to recommend the prosecution of culpable retailers who knowingly sell the drugs for
the purposes of execution. In addition, the inmates requested an evidentiary hearing on any
controlling issue of fact. 718 F.2d at 1178.
18. The inmates argued that use of drugs violated 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (1982) that states
a "new drug" is one that is "not generally recognized, among experts... as safe and effective
for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof
..... See also 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1982) (which governs the procedures for "new drug" approval
by the FDA).
19. A drug is "misbranded" unless its label provides "adequate directions for use," or
such warnings "as are necessary for the protection of users." 21 U.S.C. § 352(f) (1982). The
inmates "appended to their petition affidavits of leading medical and scientific experts which
aver that there is no 'expert consensus' founded upon 'substantial evidence' that these drugs
will produce death quickly and without pain and discomfort." 718 F.2d at 1177-78.
20. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1982).
21. Under 21 C.F.R. § 5.10 (1986), the Secretary of Health and Human Services may
delegate authority to the Commissioner to implement the FDCA. The Commissioner refused
to investigate the inmates' claim for two reasons: "(1) the case law on the unapproved use of
drugs that were otherwise approved by FDA was not uniform, and (2) FDA had a policy of
not initiating enforcement action against unapproved uses of approved drugs absent 'serious
danger to the public health.'" 718 F.2d at 1178. These are typical prosecutorial reasons for
denial of enforcement proceedings. The FDA also argued that state sanctioned use of the
drugs for lethal injection came under the " 'practice of medicine' exception to the FDCA."
718 F.2d at 1179. The legislative history of the FDCA shows a particular exemption carved
out in order to avoid interference with a physician's treatment of his or her patients. See Legal
Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs; Prescribing for Uses Unapproved by the
Food and Drug Administration, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503 (1972).
22. Chaney v. Schweiker, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH)
38,184, at 39,031 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 1982).
23. Id. at 39,032-33.
24. Id. at 39,037.
25. Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 1649
(1985).
26. 718 F.2d at 1183 n.22. In support of this proposition the court of appeals cited
Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975); WHHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir.
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FDA's refusal to investigate to be arbitrary and capricious.27 The Court of
Appeals recognized the possible application of section 701(a)(2) of the APA,
but observed the existence of a "strong presumption" that all agency actions
are inherently reviewable and that statutory exceptions merit extremely nar-
row interpretation.28
A unanimous Supreme Court reversed, 29 holding that the FDA's decision
not to take the requested enforcement measures was precisely the type of
action immune from review under section 701(a)(2) of the APA.3 ° In con-
trast to the established presumption of reviewability of all agency action, the
Court fashioned a new presumption exempting agency enforcement deci-
sions from judicial review.31 In concurring opinions, Justices Brennan and
Marshall expressed a more limited acceptance of the new nonreviewability
presumption. 32 Justice Brennan endorsed the majority's holding under the
particular facts presented but maintained that all agency decisions should
remain within the purview of the judiciary.33 Justice Marshall, however,
was more critical of the new presumption of nonreviewability of enforcement
decisions. Arguing that such a doctrine undermined past precedent, he
warned that the new presumption would cause unintended citizen hardship
at the hands of a disinterested and unaccountable bureaucracy.34
This Note will trace the development of the presumption of judicial review
relied on by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals35 and will examine
earlier judicial treatment of agency enforcement discretion under section
701(a)(2) of the APA.36 An analysis of Chaney will suggest a judicial reluc-
tance to recognize the increasing frequency with which review was given to
all actions of administrators under the APA. The Note will demonstrate
that by holding enforcement decisions to be committed to agency discretion
by law, Chaney applies section 701(a)(2) to place such administrative deci-
sions presumptively beyond judicial scrutiny. This Note will conclude with
an evaluation of the present condition of agency discretion and the impact of
Chaney on future decisions.
1981); Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam); Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
27. 718 F.2d at 1190.
28. Id. at 1183 n.23.
29. Heckler v. Chaney, 105 S. Ct. 1649 (1985).
30. Id. at 1654.
31. Id. at 1656.
32. Id. at 1659-68.
33. Id. at 1659-60 (Brennan, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 1660-68 (Marshall, J., concurring).
35. See 718 F.2d at 1188 n.36.
36. See Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed To Agency
Discretion," 82 HARV. L. REV. 367 (1968).
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I. THE COMMON LAW PRESUMPTION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The majority of administrative agencies are part of the executive branch
and derive their operating authority from enabling legislation written by
Congress.37 While a particular administration may dictate policy and Con-
gress may rewrite statutes, executive agencies retain a large degree of auton-
omy and discretion in the routine administration of their charge.38 Access
to federal courts by aggrieved individuals is crucial to ensure an examination
of a particular agency action.39 Should such access be foreclosed, the action
stands beyond any immediate scrutiny.4"
Whether judicial review of agency actions is available turns on various
considerations.41 Upon examination of the particular statute governing an
agency activity, the reviewing court will reach one of three conclusions: the
statute expressly provides for review;42 the statute is completely silent on
review;43 or the statute precludes review." If the statute expressly provides
37. As defined by the APA,
'agency' means each authority of the Government of the United States... but does
not include ... the Congress ... the courts ... the governments of the territories or
possessions of the United States ... the government of the District of Columbia...
agencies composed of representatives of the parties or of representatives of organiza-
tions of the parties to the disputes determined by them.
5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(A)-(E) (1982).
38. See supra notes 1-3.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. In answering the question of whether judicial review is available the reviewing court
must consider: (1) whether the Congress has permitted or precluded review in the enabling
legislation; (2) whether the action has been brought by plaintiff with proper standing; (3)
whether the suit has been brought against the proper defendant; (4) whether the timing is
proper; (5) whether the action is ripe for judicial review; (6) whether the proper formalities of
review have been observed. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, § 8.1.
42. If the statute expressly provides for review, the legislative will must be respected.
Such a review action must be brought in the form specified by the enabling legislation. In this
regard, the discretion of the legislature is quite broad. Diverse forms of review actions exist.
See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1982) (review requires filing of a
petition); Longshoreman's & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 921 (1982)
(review requires filing a suit for injunction); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 7801 (McKinney 1978)
(review requires a certiorari proceeding); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11,523 (West 1980) (review
requires an action for mandamus); B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, § 8.3, at 441; see also id. § 8.3,
at 439.
43. Statutory silence on review is a particularly troublesome predicament for the courts.
From an early date courts have held, largely as a matter of policy, that in the absence of
specific statutory provisions for review, courts must possess some means of controlling admin-
istrative officers. As Justice Marshall observed, "it would excite some surprise if, in a govern-
ment of laws and of principle . . . a ministerial officer might, at his discretion, issue this
powerful process ... leaving to [the individual] no remedy, no appeal to the laws of his coun-
try." United States v. Nourse, 31 U.S. (9 Pet.) 8, 28-29 (1835); see Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S.
288 (1944); see also infra notes 52-58 and accompanying text. But see 321 U.S. 288, 312 (1944)
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for review, the inquiry obviously ends there. Those statutes that preclude
review, which are vaguely written, or are completely silent on the question of
review, launch the judicial inquiry into congressional intent.45
Fundamentally, Congress and the courts bring competing concerns to the
question of agency authority. Congress is careful not to restrict an agency's
ability to deal imaginatively with the exigencies of day-to-day regulation.46
Conversely, the courts, though mindful of the prerogatives of the legislature,
seek review where equity and the protection of fundamental rights de-
mand.47 The objective shared by both branches is to maintain the legality of
agency authority in light of the constitutional plan of balanced governing
authority. The presumption that all agency actions are reviewable serves
this end.48
The presumption of review arose out of the courts' general equity jurisdic-
tion.49 Parties aggrieved by agency action had recourse to federal district
courts, which had general jurisdiction over acts regulating interstate com-
merce. 50 Statutory language permitting judicial review was unnecessary.
The mere omission of legislative language was insufficient to bar judicial
access. 51
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("There is no such thing as a common law of judicial review in
federal courts.").
44. Even the most explicit legislative pronouncements of nonreviewability are discounted
by the courts. For instance the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides that the
INA's deportation decisions "shall be final." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1982). The logical, literal
interpretation of such a statute would preclude review of such a decision in the courts.
"[T]here is a plain and sufficient meaning for the words making their decision final-and that
is that it shall be final where it is most likely to be questioned, in the courts." Pearson v.
Williams, 202 U.S. 281, 285 (1906). Yet, the word "final" has been construed as "ambiguous"
and in spite of its placement in the INA, deportation decisions have always been subject to
judicial review through deportation proceedings. United States ex rel. Trinler v. Carusi, 166
F.2d 457, 461 (3d Cir. 1948). In the landmark decision of Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S.
48 (1955), the Supreme Court addressed this provision of the INA in light of the "generous
review provisions" of the APA. The Court removed all doubt that courts will not be left out of
the agency adjudication process. "It is more in harmony with the generous review provisions
of the [APA] to construe the ambiguous word 'final' in the 1952 Immigration Act as referring
to finality in administrative procedure rather than as cutting off the right of judicial review in
whole or in part." 349 U.S. at 51.
45. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, §§ 8.1-8.6.
46. Id. § 8.4.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See supra note 4.
50. Id.
51. As Justice Reed wrote, "the silence of Congress as to judicial review is ... not to be
construed as a denial of authority to the aggrieved person to seek appropriate relief in the
federal courts." Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309 (1944).
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Stark v. Wickard 52 is the leading case on legislative silence. In Stark, the
Secretary of Agriculture promulgated regulations to set minimum milk
prices in the Boston area,5 3 pursuant to the Agricultural Marketing Agree-
ment Act of 1937." 4 Under the rules, commercial producers received a par-
ticular sum less an amount collected by the Secretary in order to subsidize
milk-producing cooperatives. 5' The commercial producers sought judicial
review of the regulations, alleging that the agency abused its statutory au-
thority.56 The Secretary defended his action by arguing that review was un-
available because the enabling legislation failed to address the subject.5 7
The Supreme Court rejected the Secretary's claim, holding that the agency
possessed only that authority which Congress had provided in the statute.5"
The Court observed that denial of judicial review serves the agency, increas-
ing its power. Accordingly, a statutory omission could not give rise to such
52. Id. Although it never directly addresses the matter, Stark is based upon a notion of
due process. Due process of law is not applicable unless one has been deprived of something to
which she has a right. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Where no such right
existed there was no presumption of review. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, §§ 5.11, 8.7.
The government may give a "privilege" to someone who had no previous right and condition
this new right by whatever terms it chooses. Id. The privilege of conducting business with the
United States government, for example, justified one's abrogation of the right to judicial re-
view. The Supreme Court held this in Perkins v. Lukins Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940). The
government may rightfully condition the terms of acceptance on the privileges it grants. In
this area, the courts were powerless to apply the presumption of judicial review. "Courts
should not, where Congress has not done so, subject purchasing agencies of Government to the
delays necessarily incident to judicial scrutiny .... " 310 U.S. at 130.
The enactment of the APA quickly terminated this common law doctrine of nonreview.
Under the APA, all "agency action" was made subject to judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 704
(1982). See supra note 37. The "Privileges" referred to by common law now fall within the
rubric of "agency action" under the Act. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1982). Today, in the so called
privilege cases, legislative silence is no longer a bar to review. See Gull Airborne Instruments,
Inc. v. Weinberger, 694 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C.
Cir. 1964).
53. 321 U.S. at 291, 302.
54. Pub. L. No. 75-137, 50 Stat. 246 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-659 (1982)).
55. Id. at 302.
56. The petitioners alleged that the Secretary's plan was "unlawfully diverting funds" that
belonged to them. Id. at 289. "It is this deduction which the producers challenge as beyond
the Secretary's statutory power." Id. at 302.
57. Id. at 306-07.
58. "When Congress passes an Act empowering administrative agencies to carry on gov-
ernmental activities, the power of those agencies is circumscribed by the authority granted."
Id. at 309 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165 (1803)). See also Commis-
sioner v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co., 320 U.S. 418 (1943); United States v. Carolina
Freight Carriers Corp., 315 U.S. 475, 489 (1942); Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 479
(1936); International R.R. v. Davidson, 257 U.S. 506, 514 (1922); Interstate Commerce
Comm'n v. Union Pacific R.R., 222 U.S. 541, 547 (1912); American School of Magnetic Heal-
ing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 109-10 (1902).
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an expansion of agency authority.59 The Court embraced the rule of pre-
sumptive access to courts for those aggrieved by agency actions.
60
Stark illustrated the importance of maintaining access to the courts for the
purposes of obtaining review. The presumption of judicial review insured
access despite the legislative failure to provide for review. Four years later,
Stark's principle of review was embodied in the APA that made all "agency
action" subject to judicial scrutiny.6 1 Section 701(a)(1) of the Act specifi-
59. 321 U.S. at 309-11.
60. Id. Justice Frankfurter, however, dissented, declaring "[t]here is no such thing as a
common law of judicial review in the federal courts." Id. at 312. He argued that Congress
alone was charged with the power to allow judicial review. The question of whether review is
available, who may invoke it, when and to what degree it is permitted, he believed, must be
embodied in the enabling statute in order for courts to examine agency actions. Congress, not
the courts, has the opportunity and resources to provide the provisions for review. To apply
judicial review provisions to a statute where there is none is "mischievous." Id. "Apart from
the text and texture of a particular law in relation to which judicial review is sought, 'judicial
review' is a mischievous abstraction." Id.
Justice Frankfurter's view, however, had obvious flaws. Taken literally, if the Secretary had
exceeded his authority, no recourse at law would be available for the producers aggrieved by
the Secretary's order. Consequently, the courts would be powerless to address unlawful or
extrastatutory agency conduct. The agency would be the final judge of its actions. His argu-
ment against the presumption of judicial review "overlooked the fact that the federal courts,
like all courts, exist to uphold the rule of law." B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, § 8.4.
61. The language of § 10 embodies the principle of judicial review. See supra notes 5-6.
Enacting the bill, the President's Committee on Administrative Management, appointed by
President Roosevelt to study the growth and intensification of the regulatory administration,
cited the unhealthy condition of conflicting pressures on administrative officers to be both
prosecutor and judge. See H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), reprinted in 1946
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1195.
Section 701 is a modem, codified embodiment of an entrenched but unwritten judicial con-
cern over protecting internal agency actions from unnecessary external scrutiny. In order to
justify the exclusion of particular agency actions from judicial review on the merits, courts
created and employed a number of doctrines to protect agency autonomy. Employing such
doctrines as sovereign immunity, separation of powers, and justiciability, courts erected legal
barriers to review of an agency's internal decisionmaking process. Similarly, such procedural
doctrines as standing, exhaustion of administrative remedies, and ripeness served to inhibit
judicial scrutiny of internal agency decisions. See infra note 69. The unwritten purpose of
such barriers to review was to grant agencies the leeway necessary to cope with the enormous
workload burdens demanded of limited agency resources. In the face of such caseloads, it was
believed that agency activity would be severely burdened if each of its decisions were subject to
challenge by aggrieved petitioners. See generally 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 8.
The concept of judicial deference to an agency's determination of particular policy has its
origin in the doctrine of "prosecutorial discretion." The reasons advanced for non-
reviewability stem from this doctrine of administrative efficiency. An enormous volume of
both civil and criminal violations and the physical limitations of time and resources restrict the
office of the prosecutor to the prosecution of only a small fraction of violators. Which viola-
tors shall be pursued and which shall not has traditionally been left to the discretion of the
prosecutor whose knowledge of the particular facts, chances for conviction, and availability of
resources make such a cost-benefit analysis possible. See generally id. § 9.2.
A decision not to prosecute or enforce rarely undergoes judicial review. Most such deci-
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cally withholds its review provisions when the enabling statute expressly al-
lows. 6 2 Section 701(a)(2) withholds review for an action "committed to
agency discretion by law."
63
II. EARLY INTERPRETATION OF EXCLUSIONS TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
PROVIDED BY SECTION 701 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT
The APA defines reviewable acts as "[e]very agency action made review-
able by statute and every final agency action for which there is no other
adequate remedy in any court.",64 However, this right of review could be
revoked by explicit language in the enabling legislation.65 Similarly, if the
matter sought to be reviewed is one committed to the discretion of the
agency "by law," judicial review is withheld.66 These two exemptions from
review guarded an agency's inner operations from the scrutiny of the
sions, by their nature, go unnoticed as there are oftentimes neither aggrieved parties nor anx-
ious constituencies to object. Yet, a decision to refrain from action can have a silent impact far
more damaging to society and its legal integrity than a decision requiring visible agency action.
Often it is only when administrative actions cross a vested interest that objections are voiced
and the question of review arises.
62. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(l) (1982) provides: "This chapter applies ... except to the extent
that ... statutes preclude judicial review."
63. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982) provides: "This chapter applies ... except to the extent
that... agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." Although the interpretation
of § 701(a)(2) is the focus of this Note, a brief examination of the statutory preclusion provi-
sion of § 701(a)(l) illustrates the zeal with which courts defend the right to review acts, even
when seemingly precluded by statute under § 701(a)(1).
One example of judicial intolerance of statutory preclusions is found in Oestereich v. Selec-
tive Serv. Bd., 393 U.S. 233 (1968). In Oestereich, a divinity student was reclassified as "I-A,"
making him immediately available for the draft despite his statutory entitlement to a deferral.
393 U.S. at 325. See 50 U.S.C. § 456(g)(2) (1982). The Military Selective Service Act of 1967,
Pub. L. No. 90-40, 81 Stat. 100 (1967) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 451 et seq. (1982)),
expressly precluded review of the reclassification prior to induction. The legislative history
clearly indicated a congressional intent to prevent any courtroom contest prior to induction.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court granted preinduction judicial review of the reclassification.
393 U.S. at 239. Refusing to give the statute its literal interpretation, the Court said
"[e]xamples are legion where literalness in statutory language is out of harmony either with
constitutional requirements ... or with an Act taken as an organic whole." Id. at 238. The
separation of powers doctrine and the exigencies of constitutional fairness forced the Court to
ignore the extreme language precluding review. Id. at 243. In short, the student's liberty
interest demanded the right to a courtroom hearing. Id. at 243 n.6.
An examination of the common law foundation of judicial review and the reluctance of
courts to deny access even in the face of an express preclusion highlights the uniqueness of the
APA's exception for agency discretion.
64. APA § 10(c) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1982)).
65. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1982); supra note 62.
66. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982); supra note 63.
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courts. 67 The second exception resisted incorporation with the general pre-
sumption of review, remained undefined, and until Heckler v. Chaney, was of
dubious practical application.
The Supreme Court initially developed the application of section 701 in
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner.68 In Abbott, drug manufacturers sought and
eventually won judicial review of regulations promulgated by the FDA to
tighten generic drug labeling requirements. 69  Following Stark, Justice
67. See supra note 61.
68. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
69. Abbott involved the FDA's promulgation, pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA), Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984)), of regulations requiring drug manufacturers to
designate the generic name of the drug alongside of its labeled trade name. 21 U.S.C.
§§ 352(e)(1)(B), 352(e)(2) (1982 & Supp. I 1984). In the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware, drug manufacturers sought and won injunctive relief voiding the regula-
tions before they were enforced. 228 F. Supp. 855 (D. Del. 1964). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed without reaching the merits, holding there could be no
judicial review of regulations prior to an enforcement action. 352 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1965).
The Supreme Court reversed, granting the manufacturers preenforcement judicial review of
the challenged regulations because nothing in the FDCA precluded such review and the con-
troversy was ripe for judicial resolution. 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967).
Whether the pharmaceutical companies' problems deserved judicial attention or simply the
attention of the agency was another concern of the Court. Id. While eager to assist the ag-
grieved, the Court declined to place itself in the middle of the rulemaking process of proposal,
comment, and dispute. The Court measured the finality of the regulations promulgated by the
costs imposed on the company. Id. at 152. Finding "a direct effect on the day-to-day business
of all prescription drug companies," the Court considered the costs of conversion necessary to
comply with the regulations to be an appropriate factor for review. Id.
One concern of the doctrines of standing, exhaustion of administrative remedies, and ripe-
ness requirements is, when is it best to apply judicial review of administrative action. Standing
and exhaustion of administrative remedies make technical and procedural inquiries, while the
ripeness doctrine requires a more inchoate assessment of the role of judicial review in the
administrative process. Standing requires that the aggrieved party show actual injury due to
agency action or inaction. See infra note 74. Exhaustion requires that judicial intervention be
sought only after all other internal avenues of appeals are closed. Ripeness requires a certain
maturation of the issues before the introduction of judicial review. See generally K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT §§ 20.01, 21.01 (2d ed. 1972); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 395-98, 424-26 (1965).
Application of the ripeness doctrine has fluctuated, with some courts refusing to consider
cases of present injury, while others allow questions based upon abstract or remote factual
possibilities. Abbott represents a middle ground on the spectrum. The drug manufacturers
received review prior to enactment of the regulation or injury to the parties because the admin-
istrative process had reached the point where it would imminently affect the manufacturers.
The ripeness doctrine examines adverse effect, concreteness and imminence of the agency act
to determine whether judicial review is appropriate. This doctrine helps free the court from
engaging in disputes over agency policies. Nevertheless, ripeness for review exists in tension
with the hardship suffered by an aggrieved party. The doctrine reflects the weight given by the
Court to unencumbered agency action, but to the extent that priority is given to noninterfer-
ence with internal agency decisions and policies, the doctrine is similar in effect to the agency
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Harlan enunciated what would become the maxim of the presumption of
review doctrine. "[Jiudicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved
person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that
such was the purpose of Congress."70 According to Abbott, only absolute
Congressional intent to exempt particular agency actions from judicial scru-
tiny, as provided in the statutory language and legislative history of the en-
abling legislation, would preclude such review.71 The FDA argued that
specific procedures in the statute for review of enumerated regulations cre-
ated the presumption that those regulations left unaddressed were exempt
from judicial examination.72 Abbott flatly rejected this presumption of ex-
emption due to statutory omission.73 Instead, statutory silence was held to
establish a presumption of reviewability rebuttable only by specific evidence
of a congressional design to exempt the particular regulations from review.74
discretion doctrine. Neither doctrine considers the potential hardship of tremendous agency
authority on the citizen. L. JAFFE, supra at 395-98.
70. 387 U.S. at 140.
71. Id. at 140; see Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184
(1958); Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958); Brownell v. We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956);
Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953); Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Ag-
new, 329 U.S. 441 (1947); Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944); Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent.
R.R., 305 U.S. 177 (1938).
72. "The issue, however, is not so readily resolved; we must go further and inquire
whether in the context of the entire legislative scheme the existence of that circumscribed
remedy evinces a congressional purpose to bar agency action not within its purview from judi-
cial review." 387 U.S. at 141.
73. To strengthen its pronouncement of a presumption of review of all final agency ac-
tions, Abbott made extensive use of the legislative history of the APA and the Declaratory
Judgment Act, Pub. L. No. 73-512, 48 Stat. 955 (1934) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2201, 2202 (1982)), strengthening the argument for presumptive review of all final agency
actions. See H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946), reprinted in ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 235
(1944-1946): "To preclude judicial review under this bill a statute, if not specific in withhold-
ing such review, must upon its face give clear and convincing evidence of an intent to withhold
it. The mere failure to provide specially by statute for judicial review is certainly no evidence
of intent to withhold review." See also S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945),
reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. Doc. No. 248,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 185 (1944-1946).
74. 387 U.S. at 141. Abbott became the touchstone for exceptions to review of agency
actions. Its language was subsequently cited by many courts ruling on the question of review.
See, e.g., City of Chicago v. United States, 396 U.S. 162, 164 (1969) ("we start with the pre-
sumption that aggrieved persons may obtain review"); Aquavella v. Richardson, 437 F.2d 397,
400 (2d Cir. 1971) (recognizing the Abbott articulation of the presumption of reviewability);
Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 500 F.2d 812, 814
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (asserting that nonreviewability must be clearly shown to be the intention of
Congress); Pollard v. Romney, 512 F.2d 295, 298 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding review of agency
action may be foreclosed by Congress); Colon v. Carter, 633 F.2d 964, 967 (1st Cir. 1980)
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III. DISCRETIONARY AGENCY AUTHORITY: EARLY SUPREME COURT
TREATMENT OF SECTION 701(A)(2)
A. The "Law to Apply" Test: Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe
The Supreme Court's peripheral treatment of section 701(a)(2) indicated
an entrenched predisposition favoring judicial review in all cases, implicitly
narrowing the "committed to agency discretion by law" exemption.75
(recognizing the strong presumption of reviewability may be overcome only by the clear pur-
pose of Congress).
Three years after Abbott the Supreme Court reaffirmed its pronouncement in Association of
Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). In Data Processing, plaintiffs
sought judicial review in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota of a
ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency allowing national banks to make data processing
services available. 279 F. Supp. 675 (D. Minn. 1968). The District Court dismissed and was
affirmed on appeal. 406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969). Reversing the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court reiterated the presumption of review stating that "[tihere is
no presumption against judicial review and in favor of administrative absolutism . . . unless
that purpose is fairly discernible in the statutory scheme." 397 U.S. at 157.
In Data Processing, the Supreme Court had implicitly sanctioned a two-tier inquiry for eval-
uating the reviewability of an agency act. First, did the statute preclude judicial review on its
face? If not, was there any evidence of congressional intent, express or implied, to preclude
review or to commit the challenged action to the agency's discretion? The preclusion of review
was unlikely to be inferred from a less than specific legislative history. Advocates of preclusion
bore a heavy burden of proof. Review of administrative action was the rule-nonreview the
unwelcome exception requiring clear evidence in the legislative history. Id.
Data Processing addressed the related question of standing. The Court focused on whether
the challenged action had caused some injury in fact, whether economic, "'aesthetic, conserva-
tional, and recreational'" or otherwise to the plaintiffs. 397 U.S. at 151, 154 (quoting Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
941 (1966)). Standing requires the injured interest to be arguably within the "zone of interests
to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." 397 U.S.
at 153. The APA grants standing to sue or enjoin agency action to any person "aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
Article III of the Constitution provides the framework for which standing in the federal
courts is to be considered. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States ... [and] to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
75. Any amount of unchecked discretionary authority is fundamentally inconsistent with
our scheme of democratic governance and is incongruous with the system of checks and bal-
ances. See supra notes 1-2. This discrepancy does not go unnoticed and it has rightly been
said that "the American legal system-federal, state, and local-is shot through with excessive
and unnecessary discretionary power in the hands of miscellaneous and diverse administrators
of many kinds." 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 8, § 9:1, at 216. Agency enforcement discretion
seems particularly subject to suspicion of abuse. Id.
The APA provides that actions committed to agency discretion are to be exempt from re-
view under § 701(a)(2). Yet, the Act also allows "all agency actions" to be reviewed "for
abuse of discretion" under § 706(2)(A). 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). A question naturally
arises: how can discretionary action be reviewable for abuse while simultaneously being ex-
empt from all review? 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 8, § 28:6. A frequent assertion is that the APA
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In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 76 the Secretary of Transpor-
tation approved federal funding to construct a highway that would sever a
public park and destroy twenty-six acres of parkland.77 The petitioners
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Tennessee to enjoin construction and to obtain judicial review of the Secre-
tary's decision.78 In response, the Secretary pointed to his wide discretion
which was unreviewable under section 701(a)(2) of the APA.79 Construing
its review powers narrowly, the District Court denied the injunction. The
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. s
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, flatly rejecting the agency's
contention that its discretion was unreviewable.81 Upon examining the en-
abling legislation,82 the Court found "clear and specific directives"83 for the
Secretary's discretionary exercise of his highway funding authority. The
Court cited Abbott for the proposition that the legislation must set forth
" 'clear and convincing evidence' "of a congressional intent to restrict access
to judicial review.84 Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall found that the
Act's directives evinced a congressional intent to force the Secretary's deci-
sionmaking to conform to particular standards.8 5 The decision was, there-
fore, judicially reviewable to ensure that it fell within those boundaries.8 6
Borrowing from the legislative history of the APA, the Court held section
701(a)(2) to be inapplicable except "in those rare instances where 'statutes
are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to ap-
ply.' 987 Here there was plainly "law to apply" and, therefore, the "commit-
ted to agency discretion" exemption was inapplicable.
demands review of discretion. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AC-
TION 365 (1965). Conversely, it is propounded that an agency's enforcement discretion mir-
rors that of the criminal prosecutor's discretion and, therefore, is given little review. K.
DAVIS, supra note 8, § 9:6. Although courts had given mixed indications of the reviewability
of enforcement discretion, the Supreme Court had no occasion to address the question directly
until Heckler v. Chaney. See infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
76. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
77. Id. at 406.
78. 309 F. Supp. 1189 (W.D. Tenn. 1970).
79. 401 U.S. at 411.
80. 432 F.2d 1307 (6th Cir. 1970).
81. 401 U.S. at 413.
82. Department of Transportation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931 (1966)
(codified as amended 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1982)). The case also involved scrutiny of the Fed-
eral-Aid Highway Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-495, 82 Stat. 815 (1968) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15, 23, and 49 U.S.C.).
83. 401 U.S. at 411.
84. Id. at 410 (quoting Abbott, 387 U.S. at 141).
85. Id. at 411.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 410 (quoting S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945)).
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The "law to apply" test introduced in Overton Park effectively limited the
practical application of section 701(a)(2). Reflecting the concern voiced in
Abbott for discerning congressional intent, this test closely scrutinized the
enabling statute's description of the particular discretionary authority."8
Under the test, the existence of statutory standards to evaluate agency dis-
cretion provides a reviewing court with "law to apply." Therefore, the ac-
tion is reviewable. 9 Conversely, absent statutory guidelines, discretion is
presumed committed to the agency by law or, more accurately, by the ab-
sence of law. 90
B. Dunlop v. Bachowski: Judicial Review of an
Agency Enforcement Decision
An excellent example of the Supreme Court's willingness to review an
agency decision to refuse enforcement action is Dunlop v. Bachowski.9' In
Dunlop, a dissatisfied loser in a union election sought an investigation by the
Department of Labor into his allegation of violations of section 401 of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA).
92
After a preliminary investigation, the Secretary decided not to institute fur-
ther civil proceedings against the alleged violators. 93 The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissed Bachowski's
action for review of the Secretary's decision,94 but the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 95
Citing Abbott Laboratories, the Third Circuit determined that the agency
88. Justice Marshall's opinion focuses extensively on the enabling legislation. See supra
note 82; see also 401 U.S. at 412 n.29.
89. "Plainly, there is 'law to apply' and thus the exemption for action 'committed to
agency discretion' is inapplicable." 401 U.S. at 413.
90. Id. at 413. Overton Park left § 701(a)(2) untested, and did not address the unlikely
circumstance where no law applied. The requirement of "clear and convincing evidence" of
congressional intent demanded explicit statutory language to preclude review under
§ 701(a)(1). The question of what language would suffice to commit an action to the discretion
of the agency under § 701(a)(2) remained unanswered. An express preclusory clause would
remove the action from the "by law" exception and would place it within the § 701(a)(1)
exception, presumably leaving § 701(a)(2) with little, if any, practical application.
91. 421 U.S. 560 (1975).
92. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 532 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 481
(1982)); 421 U.S. at 562.
93. 421 U.S. at 563.
94. The district court issued no opinion with its order granting the motion for dismissal.
According to the record established at the hearing, "the court concluded that it lacked 'au-
thority' to find the Secretary's actions were arbitrary and capricious and to order him to file
suit." Bachowski v. Brennan, 502 F.2d 79, 83 n.5 (3d Cir. 1974) (citing Doc. 9, at 27 (W.D.
Pa., Civ. No. 73-0954)).
95. 502 F.2d at 85.
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shouldered the burden of demonstrating that the Secretary's decision was
exempt from review.9 6 Finding the burden had not been met, the court con-
cluded that judicial review of the Secretary's decision "would further the
general policy of [the LMRDA] by ensuring that the Secretary does not
deny a remedy to those whose rights Congress sought to protect."9 7 This,
clearly, disposed of the question of whether review was precluded under sec-
tion 701(a)(1). Turning to the Secretary's assertion that his enforcement dis-
cretion was exempt from review under section 701(a)(2), the court stated
that "we do not mean to deny that the Secretary has considerable discretion
in the exercise of his enforcement powers .... However, the fact that an
agency action involves some discretion does not necessarily make it unre-
viewable." 9' The court dismissed the idea that enforcement discretion, like
criminal prosecutorial discretion, was traditionally unreviewable and upheld
judicial review of the Secretary's decision. 99
96. The court of appeals stated that the plaintiff seemed to be entitled to APA review of
the Secretary's decision under § 702, unless the decision was shielded from such review by
either of the provisions of § 701(a). "The burden of establishing such exclusion, however, is on
the defendants." 502 F.2d at 84 (citing Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967)).
97. 502 F.2d at 85.
98. Id. at 86.
99. The court dealt with, at some length, the Secretary's assertion that his decision
whether to bring suit was protected from review under the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion.
Id. at 86-89.
Federal courts have often decided the question of review of agency inaction under
§ 701(a)(2) but seldom with any uniformity. The Securities and Exchange Commission's ef-
forts to shield its enforcement decisions respecting shareholder proxy regulations is illustrative
of the treatment given to enforcement decisions by many federal courts. In Medical Comm.
for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals granted review of the Commission's formal approval of a staff recommendation
against action on petitioner's shareholder proxy proposal. Id. at 668. The court permitted
review based on an express provision of the Security and Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)
which allowed review of any order issued by the Commission. Id. at 665 (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 78(a) (1964)). According to the court, the lack of formality and finality of the staff's recom-
mendation made the Commission's formal acceptance of it a reviewable agency order. Id. at
668.
The Commission subsequently declined to take the same formal action on a similar staff
recommendation in Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Recognizing the ab-
sence of a final order by the Commission, the same court denied review because the staff did
not have the authority to make such an " 'order issued by the Commission'" necessary for
review under the statute. Id. at 644. The Kixmiller decision relied on Medical Committee in
granting the SEC wide discretion in processing the " 'formidable number of proxy statements
in limited time and with insufficient manpower.'" Id. at 645 (quoting 432 F.2d at 674). The
court cited § 701(a)(2) in support of its assertion that "[a]n agency's decision to refrain from
an investigation or an enforcement action is generally unreviewable." Id. at 645. In the final
analysis, however, the decision rested on an interpretation of § 25(a) of the 1934 Act which
allowed only for review of the Commission's final orders. 492 F.2d at 645 n.24.
The Kixmiller court cited Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), and Jacobsen v. NLRB, 120
F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1941), in support of its general presumption of nonreviewability of enforce-
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ment discretion. Both cases construe the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), Pub. L. No.
80-120, 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1982), but neither discussed the APA. Vaca,
an oft-cited case for the proposition of unreviewable enforcement discretion, asserts that under
the NLRA, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board "has unreviewable
discretion to refuse to institute an unfair labor practice complaint." 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
Although a clear grant of unreviewable authority, the conclusion is drawn from the NLRA,
not common law or the APA.
Jacobsen is even weaker support for such a presumption. Prior to enactment of the APA,
the Third Circuit interpreted the NLRA to grant enforcement discretion to the Board only as
a fact-finder to issue complaints or prohibit unfair labor practices. 120 F.2d at 98, 100. "The
course to be pursued rests in the sound discretion of the Board and is the concern of expert
administrative policy." Id. at 100.
Similarly, in Natural Resource Defense Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
public interest groups challenged the Commission's failure to adopt their rulemaking petition
which would require publicly held corporations to make comprehensive environmental and
employment policy disclosures. Id. at 1036. Although the Commission claimed that its deci-
sion was protected under § 701(a)(2), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
granted review after an evaluation of three factors: (1) the need for judicial supervision in
order to protect the plaintiffs' concerns; (2) the burden that review would place on the agency's
effectiveness in completing its congressionally assigned role; and (3) the ripeness for judicial
review of the issue raised. Id. at 1044 (citing Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir. 1970)).
After considering these factors, the court concluded review of the SEC's enforcement discre-
tion to be appropriate. As Judge McGowan wrote: "The balance to be struck is that between
the goal of efficient and effective agency action, on the one hand, and the value of judicial
review in ensuring the rationality and fairness of agency decisionmaking, on the other." 606
F.2d at 1048.
The court then addressed the question of the suitability of the issues for review.
Perhaps the strongest argument against reviewability is the concern that the issues
posed will often not be well-suited for judicial resolution. An agency's discretionary
decision not to regulate a given activity is inevitably based, in large measure, on fac-
tors not inherently susceptible to judicial resolution-e.g., internal management con-
siderations as to budget and personnel; weighing of competing policies within a broad
statutory framework .... Further, even if an agency considers a particular problem
worthy of regulation, it may determine for reasons lying within its special expertise
that the time for action has not yet arrived.
606 F.2d at 1046 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Judge McGowan observed,
The interest of plaintiffs in this context will thus rarely present unusual or compel-
ling circumstances calling for judicial review .... [T]he [agency] has not invaded
any of [plaintiff's] substantive statutory or constitutional rights, nor singled them out
for special and seemingly unfair treatment, nor even, indeed, taken any action to alter
the status quo ante.
606 F.2d at 1045. In dicta, the court noted that the agency's level of consideration given to the
subject matter was linked to the likelihood that the decision was reviewable. "[fIn general, the
more complete an agency's consideration of an issue, the more likely it is that the ultimate
decision not to take action will be a proper subject of judicial review." Id. at 1047 n.19.
Again, in Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970), environ-
mental protection organizations petitioned the Secretary of Agriculture to exercise his statu-
tory authority to suspend the registration of pesticides containing DDT. Despite extensive
evidence of the harmful effects of the poison, the Secretary declined to undertake any action.
The facts of this case are compelling and strikingly similar to those of Heckler v. Chaney. See
supra notes 13-26 and accompanying text. The court of appeals focused on statutory authori-
zation, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-
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The Supreme Court affirmed."° Dissenting, Justice Rehnquist main-
tained that the Secretary's decision was committed to his enforcement dis-
cretion under section 701(a)(2).1 °1 Justice Rehnquist noted in support that
not only did the LMRDA make the Secretary's institution of a civil action
the sole vehicle for challenging a union election, 10 2 but that Congress de-
pended upon "the special knowledge and discretion"' 3 of the Secretary. Jus-
tice Rehnquist observed that, under the LMRDA, the Secretary's failure to
file a complaint was "precisely the kind of agency action" committed to his
discretion by section 701(a)(2) and exempted from the judicial review man-
dates of the APA.' °
C. The Criminal Prosecutor's Discretion: Similarities and Differences
A tradition of extreme judicial deference to the enforcement decisions of
the criminal prosecutor existed at common law.'0 5 Numerous courts have
reasoned that agency enforcement discretion deserves similar treatment;10 6
however, analogies between the two are not entirely helpful. 107
The Supreme Court held in United States v. Nixon,108 that "the Executive
Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to
135K (1964). Although the Act provided for judicial review "[iun a case of actual controversy
as to the validity of any order under this section," the agency argued correctly that there had
been no final order. 428 F.2d at 1098 n.21 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 135b(d) (1982)). Therefore, the
provisions for review were inapplicable. The agency argued further that there were no other
provisions for review and that in their absence, review was precluded. The no action decision
on the petition was, in reality, a final decision, but not a final order and, therefore, it was
unreviewable. Similarly, in Heckler v. Chaney, the FDA argued that the lack of a final agency
order precluded review. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text. In Hardin, the court
of appeals held the Secretary's failure to take action to be judicially reviewable. The court
rejected the Secretary's contention that his inaction was committed to his discretion under
§ 701(a)(2). 428 F.2d at 1097. The preclusion of judicial review was "not lightly to be in-
ferred" but required "clear evidence of legislative intent." Id. at 1098. The immediacy of the
circumstance and the possibility of harm to the petitioners, if correct in their claims, contrib-
uted to the court's decision to grant review. Id. at 1099.
100. "We agree ... that the Secretary's decision not to sue is not excepted from judicial
review... rather, §§ 702 and 704 subject the Secretary's decision to judicial review under the
standard specified in § 706(2)(A)." 421 U.S. at 566.
101. "It seems to me that prior decisions of this Court establish that the Secretary's deci-
sion to file or not to file [suit] is precisely the kind of 'agency action ... committed to agency
discretion by law' exempted from the judicial-review provisions of the APA." 421 U.S. at 595
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
102. 421 U.S. at 595.
103. Id. (emphasis in original).
104. Id.
105. 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 8, § 9:6.
106. Id.
107. See infra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
108. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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prosecute a case."' °9 The Court's denial of judicial review of prosecutorial
discretion was based upon the separation of powers doctrine and the belief
that "the courts are not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretion-
ary powers of the attorneys of the United States in their control over crimi-
nal prosecutions." 11 As the Second Circuit observed in Inmates of Attica
Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 11 "federal courts have traditionally and,
to our knowledge, uniformly refrained from overturning, at the instance of a
private person, discretionary decisions of federal prosecuting authorities not
to prosecute." 112
Prosecutorial discretion, however, is not entirely unreviewable. Indeed, a
prosecutor's abuse of this discretion has always remained reviewable." 
3
Criminal law has evolved in order to afford a greater opportunity for re-
view." 4  The pronouncement in Nixon was subsequently tempered by
Bordenkircher v. Hayes,I" 5 which held that "[t]here is no doubt that the
breadth of discretion that our country's legal system vests in prosecuting
attorneys carries with it the potential for both individual and institutional
abuse. And broad though that discretion may be, there are undoubtedly
constitutional limits upon its exercise."
' "16
The analogy of criminal prosecutorial discretion to agency enforcement
discretion, however, breaks down at an early stage. Criminal law prosecu-
tors seek to punish offenders after their violation. 7 The interest pursued is
that of society exacting punishment, in the form of imprisonment or penal-
ties, for a wrong already committed against its laws and its citizens."' Ad-
ministrative agencies, on the other hand, do not necessarily seek punishment
109. Id. at 693.
110. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
111. 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973).
112. Id. at 379.
113. See 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 8, § 9.6, at 240. "Although post-1974 cases are tending to
form a rather consistent body of law allowing review for affirmative abuse of prosecutors'
discretion, the law is still somewhat unclear as to reviewability of prosecutors' decisions not to
prosecute." Id. at 244. "[T]he case law since 1974 is strongly on the side of reviewability."
Id. at 240. See Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22 (1977); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S.
63, 76 (1977); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260
(1971).
114. 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 8, § 9:1, at 244. See Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139, 148
(5th Cir. 1978) (shifting burden to prosecutor to show absence of malice).
115. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
116. Id. at 365.
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but prevention of regulatory violations. 119 As the interested parties involved
usually seek injunctive relief from some immediate or impending harm,
120
the agency's failure to act may carry with it more immediate consequences,
causing more disruption and hardship for petitioning parties than would an
affirmative act. 121 Conversely, the failure to bring a criminal prosecution
only undermines society's interest in obedience to state authority.
22
119. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, §§ 2.23-2.25.
120. Id.
121. Many parties petitioning administrative agencies seek some sort of enforcement inter-
vention to redress, curtail, or prevent the occasion of a perceived harmful or undesirable activ-
ity by another. Whether the agency intervenes, often determines the outcome of the dispute.
For instance, when the Labor Department refused to file suit against the union that Walter
Bachowski alledged had manipulated his election, Bachowski was left with no other recourse
at law. Congress had endowed the Labor Department with the sole jurisdictional means for
addressing such election disputes. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975); see also
supra notes 91-104 and accompanying text. Other examples of citizen hardship resulting from
agency inaction may be more obvious. An overtly graphic example is that of Larry Leon
Chaney and the seven other inmates, who, subsequent to the Food and Drug Administration's
refusal to pursue their petition, were to be executed by lethal injection, a means that they had
claimed to be in violation of the statutory standards and had rather desperately sought agency
intervention. See Heckler v. Chaney, 105 S. Ct. 1649 (1985); see also infra notes 123-35 and
accompanying text.
122. Professor Davis treats the question of whether nonenforcement decisions pose a threat
to the general welfare in terms of the power concommitantly accorded the administrator.
But why should we be concerned with the negative power, the power not to enforce?
How can anyone be hurt by lack of enforcement? Probably, as a matter of historical
fact, such rhetorical questions are the main justification for tolerating the extreme
growth of the discretionary power not to enforce. But below the surface is a reality
of the greatest consequence: Discretionary power not to enforce is the power to dis-
criminate. Even a moment's thought should bring the realization that discretionary
power not to enforce necessarily means discretionary power to enforce; the negative
is impossible without the positive. An officer who has discretionary power not to
enforce has the power to discriminate by refraining from enforcement against a thou-
sand violators and by enforcing against one violator, even if the one violator is less
deserving of prosecution than many others. The discrimination against the one is
sharp and severe and unjust. The same injustice, although perhaps less sharp and
less severe, results from enforcement against 500 out of a thousand, especially if the
500 are selected on an irrational or other unsatisfactory basis. The negative power,
the discretionary power not to enforce, necessarily carries with it the power to dis-
criminate, and the power to discriminate is an extremely dangerous power.
2 K. DAVIS, supra note 8, § 9:1, at 218 (emphasis in original). Davis asserts that the "[p]ower
not to enforce is often turned into an affirmative weapon." Id. He concludes,
We carve on our court buildings "Equal Justice under Law." And inside the court
buildings, we do reasonably well in achieving equal justice under law. Enforcement
officers make more than ten times as many decisions involving justice or injustice as
judges do, but we do not carve on their buildings "Equal Justice under Law" because
we don't expect them to achieve it. We look the other way if an officer enforces
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IV. HECKLER V. CHANEY- ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS ARE COMMITTED
TO AGENCY DISCRETION By LAW
In Chaney v. Schweiker, 123 prison inmates sentenced to death by lethal
injection filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia seeking to set aside the FDA's decision to take no enforcement
action regarding various states' use of drugs that were unapproved for the
purpose of human execution and thus in violation of the Food and Drug
Cosmetic Act. 124 On a motion for summary judgment, the District Court
denied review of the agency enforcement decision.' 25 The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia approached the FDA's refusal
to investigate with the strong presumption of reviewability first articulated in
Stark and further developed by Abbott and Overton Park 126 In reversing the
District Court, the Court of Appeals correctly observed that, in light of these
cases, section 701(a)(2) warranted the most narrow interpretation. 27 Rely-
ing on Dunlop, 12' and citing with approval similar cases upholding review of
enforcement decisions,1 29 the Court of Appeals granted review, and held
that the agency had abused its discretion.'
30
The Supreme Court reversed. 3 ' Nearly ten years since his dissent in
against A but not against B, even if the two cases are identical, or even if the reasons
for enforcement against B are greater.
If A is the victim of unequal justice as a result of capricious exercise of discretion
not to enforce, our legal system typically gives A no remedy.
Our basic system is one of discretionary power to discriminate in making decisions
to enforce or not to enforce, and typically the discretionary power is not only uncon-
trolled by law but is even unguided by law. The uncontrolled and unguided discre-
tionary power to discriminate is in fact especially damaging to justice ....
Id. at 220. Professor Davis proposes as an alternative to the present administrative state, a
system of planned prosecuting. Wherein "new statutes, instead of authorizing enforcement,
sometimes authorize and require enforcement ...[prescribing] not only what is legal and
illegal but also what is to be enforced [and] what is not to be enforced." Id § 9:13, at 278
(emphasis in original).
123. [1982-83 Transfer Binder] Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) 38,184 (D.D.C. Aug.
30, 1982).
124. Id. at 39,035.
125. Id. at 39,037.
126. See supra notes 51-60, 68-74, and accompanying text.
127. "[T]he Supreme Court has consistently instructed us to construe narrowly the 'com-
mitted to agency discretion' exception." Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1184 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
128. Id.; see supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
129. 718 F.2d at 1183 n.22 (citing WWHT v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Carpet,
Linoleum & Resilient Tile Layers Local Union No. 419 v. Brown, 656 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1974);
Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam); Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
130. 718 F.2d at 1190.
131. Heckler v. Chaney, 105 S. Ct. 1649 (1985).
1986] 1123
Catholic University Law Review
Dunlop, Justice Rehnquist wrote close to the same argument for a unani-
mous Court in Heckler v. Chaney.'32 The opinion immediately observed
that section 701(a)(2) did not "obviously lend itself to any particular con-
struction"' 33 and went on to construe and apply it.'3 4 Elucidating the di-
chotomy between section 701(a)(1) and section 701(a)(2), the Court relied
on the "law to apply" distinction made in Overton Park. Where the enabling
legislation provided no statutory guidelines for the agency's exercise of dis-
cretion, there is no law to apply. In the absence of law to apply, the Court
reasoned, the decision is committed to the agency discretion by law under
section 701(a)(2) and is therefore unreviewable. 135
A. The New Presumption of Nonreviewability
The narrow holding of Chaney was that the Court of Appeals had errone-
ously relied on an old FDA policy statement for the requisite "law to ap-
ply.' 136 On this point, the Court specifically reversed. 137 Without "law to
apply" under the Overton Park test, review of the FDA decision should have
been denied.' 38 The Chaney opinion demonstrated the application of a test
only alluded to in Overton Park
Eager to address the larger question of the reviewability of all agency en-
forcement decisions, Justice Rehnquist announced a new presumption of
nonreviewability for all agency enforcement decisions. 139 This new pre-
sumption was in direct conflict with the principles of Stark, its progeny, and
the APA. '° Aware of prior decisions supporting reviewability, and distin-
guishing Dunlop as a case turning on statutory interpretation of the
LMRDA, Justice Rehnquist noted "the general unsuitability for judicial re-
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1654.
134. Id. at 1654-58.
135. Id. at 1657-58.
136. Id. at 1658. The Court of Appeals had held that an FDA policy statement imposed
on the agency an affirmative "obligation" to "investigate and take appropriate action against
unapproved uses of approved drugs" where such use threatened the public health. 718 F.2d
1174, 1176 (citing Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs; Prescribing for
Uses Unapproved by the Food and Drug Administration, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503, 16,504 (Aug.
15, 1972)). The Supreme Court dismissed this policy statement as vague, misinterpreted by
the Court of Appeals, and as conflicting with the FDA rule on judicial review currently found
at 21 C.F.R. § 10.45 (1986). Moreover, the Court observed that the policy statement itself was
never adopted by the FDA.
137. 105 S. Ct. at 1659.
138. Id. at 1658-59.
139. Id. at 1656. The Court concluded that "an agency's decision not to take enforcement
action should be presumed immune from judicial review under 701(a)(2)."
140. See supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
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view of agency decisions to refuse enforcement."'' The unique nature of
enforcement decisions warranted complete deference by the Court.'42
Chaney offered three reasons to support this bold assertion. The first was
administrative efficiency: "an agency decision not to enforce often involves a
complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its
expertise."' 43 The Act did not mandate agency enforcement of all regula-
tions; therefore, the FDA, not the Court, was the best judge of how to allo-
cate its limited resources.' 44 Moreover, general principles of administrative
law demanded that courts "defer to an agency's construction of the statute it
is charged with implementing, and to the procedures it adopts for imple-
menting that statute."'
' 45
Second, agency inaction posed no threat to any vested private rights be-
cause the agency did not bring its coercive powers to bear on the individ-
ual. 146 By contrast, when an agency affirmatively acts to enforce, the action
and its consequences are clearly measurable and more easily reviewable.1
47
The action itself "provides a focus for judicial review."'
148
Finally, agency refusals to enforce are similar to criminal prosecutors de-
cisions not to indict-"a decision which has long been regarded as the spe-
cial province of the Executive Branch."1 49 That "tradition" of prosecutorial
141. 105 S. Ct. at 1656. Interestingly, the Court distinguished Dunlop as a case of adequate
"law to apply." According to the Court, Dunlop "presents an example of statutory language
which supplied sufficient standards to rebut the presumption of unreviewability." 105 S. Ct. at
1657. The applicable provision of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(LMRDA) reads, "[tihe Secretary shall investigate such complaint and, if he finds probable
cause to believe that a violation ... has occurred ... he shall ... bring a civil action." Id.
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1982)). The use of the command "shall" in the LMRDA differs
from the permissive tone of the applicable statute in Chaney which reads: "The Secretary [of
the FDA] is authorized to conduct examinations and investigations ...." 21 U.S.C. § 372(a)
(1982). But cf 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 8, § 9:5, at 238 (" 'Duty' means 'no duty' and 'shall'
means 'may.' "). With the statutory differences set out, the Court concluded that "Dunlop is
thus consistent with a general presumption of unreviewability of decisions not to enforce." 105
S. Ct. at 1657.
142. 105 S. Ct. at 1657.
143. Id. at 1656.
144. "The agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many variables
involved in the proper ordering of its priorities." Id.
At this point Justice Rehnquist drew upon the "hands off" approach of previous decisions
with regard to agency expertise: courts will defer to agency interpretation of the statutes it is
charged with implementing. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., opinion); Train v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 87 (1975).
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discretion was embodied in section 701(a)(2). 15°
Justice Rehnquist's narrow ruling on the question of reviewability was
well-reasoned. His application of Overton Park's "law to apply" test to re-
move enforcement discretion decisions from judicial review is compatible
with previous case precedent. 51  However, the newly announced presump-
tion of nonreviewability rests on less sound reasoning. The separate opin-
ions of Justices Brennan and Marshall concur in the narrow holding but
reject the broad pronouncement of the new presumption. 152 Justice Mar-
shall's opinion is a loosely disguised dissent from the Court's holding that all
enforcement decisions are to be presumed immune from judicial review.' 53
B. Weaknesses in the New Presumption's Foundation
The reasoning employed by Justice Rehnquist in support of the new pre-
sumption is not entirely consistent with prior decisions.' 54 To begin, all ac-
tions of an administrative agency may be couched in terms of an action
"peculiarly within its expertise." ' 5 Given the absence of statutory language
in the FDCA on the question of review, Abbott Laboratories would have
resolved the conflict in favor of reviewability.' 56 The Court asserted that an
150. Id. The Court observed that prior decisions have held that "an agency's decision not
to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally com-
mitted to an agency's absolute discretion." Id. In support of this contention that civil
processes warrant this extreme deference to the agency, the Court cited to United States v.
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974); Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967); Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454 (1869).
151. See supra notes 75-90 and accompanying text.
152. Concurring, Justice Brennan embraced the Court's holding that the FDA's refusal to
respond to citizen requests for action are subject to a general presumption of nonreviewability.
Even so, Justice Brennan limited this new presumption so as not to affect nonenforcement
decisions where (1) an agency denies holding the statutory authority to reach certain conduct;
(2) "an agency engages in a pattern of nonenforcement"; (3) agency refusals to enforce regula-
tions validily promulgated and still in effect; (4) constitutional rights are violated; or any other
nonenforcement decision made illegitimate for illegal reasons. 105 S. Ct. at 1659-60. Notably,
in a footnote, Justice Brennan stipulated that in light of the particular facts of this case, his
concurrence "should not be misread as an expression of approval for the use of lethal injections
to effect capital punishment." Id. at 1660 n.2.
153. Justice Marshall's lengthy concurrence begins:
Easy cases at times produce bad law, for in the rush to reach a clearly ordained
result, courts may offer up principles, doctrines, and statements that calmer reflec-
tion, and a fuller understanding.., would eschew. In my view, the "presumption of
unreviewability" announced today is a product of [such a] lack of discipline ....
Id. at 1660.
154. See supra notes 52-74 and accompanying text.
155. 105 S. Ct. at 1656. Indeed once passed the threshhold jurisdictional questions, all
agencies amass expertise on whatever the subject of regulation. This has never before impeded
the process of judicial review. See generally B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, § 10.1.
156. See Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 140; see also supra notes 68-74.
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agency's inaction failed to bring coercive power to bear, thereby overlooking
the obvious hardships caused by an agency's failure to protect a class from
harm. 5 7 In fact, the argument that the "tradition" of criminal prosecutorial
discretion applies equally to agency enforcement decisions ignores the funda-
mental differences between criminal law enforcement and industry regula-
tion.'5 8  Furthermore, prosecutorial discretion is not absolute but is
judicially reviewable for abuse.159
Justice Rehnquist briefly addressed the problem regarding the interpreta-
tion of section 701, which bars review, in light of the generous review provi-
sions of section 706.160 Justice Rehnquist's "common sense" approach reads
section 706 to pertain only to "law to apply" review scenarios. In other
words, where section 701(a)(2) applies, section 706 automatically would
not. 1 61 Yet this approach would allow obvious abuses of agency enforce-
ment discretion to go completely unchecked.
62
Justice Marshall raised the concern that the new presumption would bar
courts from the proper review of flagrant abuses of agency discretion. 63
Justice Marshall's apprehension is not unjustified. He correctly observed
that the new presumption is only rebuttable when statutes provide standards
governing the exercise of discretion or show clear evidence of congressional
157. That the particular appellees in the case were adversely affected by the FDA's refusal
to investigate is beyond question. Myriad examples of similar hardship through agency inac-
tion are neither difficult to locate nor imagine. See supra note 121. The APA itself anticipates
such hardship caused by agency failure to act. Its judicial review provisions apply to all per-
sons aggrieved by such agency inaction. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
158. See supra notes 105-22 and accompanying text.
159. Patterns of prosecution that violate constitutional rights are subject to judicial review.
See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
160. "How is it... that an action committed to agency discretion can be unreviewable and
yet courts still can review agency actions for abuse of that discretion." 105 S. Ct. at 1654.
161. "This construction avoids conflict with [§ 706]-if no judicially manageable standards
are available for judging how and when an agency should exercise its discretion then it is
impossible to evaluate agency action for 'abuse of discretion.'" Id. at 1655.
162. As noted by concurring Justice Marshall. See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying
text. A recent decision explains this portion of the opinion by focusing on the law to apply
question in each case. The existence of statutory language circumscribing the exercise of dis-
cretion rebuts the presumption of nonreviewability. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit has concluded: "Thus we read Chaney solely as reaffirming the recognized
position that § 701(a)(2) applies in certain circumstances where courts are unqualified to de-
cide whether an agency has abused its discretion." Cardoza v. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm., 768 F.2d 1542, 1549 (7th Cir. 1985).
The court cited Professor Davis criticizing the "law to apply test" of Overton Park as un-
sound and without basis in law or logic. "The idea is flagrantly and obviously unsound, be-
cause, whether or not law applies, a judicial check is often needed to assure that administrative
action is not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion." 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 8, § 28:8,
at 290 (emphasis in original).
163. 105 S. Ct. at 1661.
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intent to allow review.' 6 4 If left unrebutted by the enabling legislation, the
new presumption would protect even the most egregious enforcement deci-
sions.' 61 Vexatious, retaliatory or unconscionable agency reasons for refus-
ing enforcement action would stand without judicial correction.' 
66
To anticipate future judicial interpretation, the facts in Heckler v. Chaney
should be read closely. 167 Despite the Court's broad pronouncement of a
new presumption of nonreviewability, there are formidable obstacles to its
unfettered application. 16  Constitutional questions, for instance, could pre-
sumably alter the outcome.' 69 The Court, however, did not address this pos-
164. With this observation Justice Marshall objects to the limited opportunities for rebuttal
which "implies far too narrow a reliance on positive law, either statutory or constitutional."
Id. at 1667.
165. Id. at 1668.
166. Justice Marshall observed, "a refusal to enforce that stems from a conflict of interest,
that is the result of a bribe, vindictiveness or retaliation, or that traces to personal or other
corrupt motives ought to be judicially remediable." Id. at 1667. See Marshall v. Jerricho,
Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249-50 (1980) (factors of personal interest in the prosecutorial decision may
be impermissible and raise constitutional questions). Such impermissible motives for enforce-
ment decisionmaking are precisely the wrong Congress and the APA sought to avoid.
167. So cautions Justices Brennan and Marshall. 105 S. Ct. at 1660. In the final paragraph
of the majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist provides a caveat: "No colorable claim is made
(that the FDA's] refusal to institute proceedings violated any constitutional rights .... " Id. at
1659.
Indeed, subsequent decisions following Chaney have construed the opinion narrowly. See
California Human Dev. Corp. v. Brock. 762 F.2d 1044, 1048 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (agency
action circumscribed by statute is subject to judicial review); Donovan v. Daniel Marr & Son,
763 F.2d 477, 484 (1st Cir. 1985) (Secretary of Labor's decision not to issue citations is unre-
viewable); Falkowski v. EEOC, 764 F.2d 907, 908-11 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Department of Justice
decision not to appoint counsel is tantamount to enforcement discretion in Chaney and unre-
viewable); Gillis v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Services, 759 F.2d 565, 576 (6th
Cir. 1985); see also Cardoza v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm., 768 F.2d 1542, 1549-51
(distinguishing Chaney as based upon the particular lack of FDA statutory authority and re-
stating the importance of reviewability; "judicial scrutiny ... is the type of traditional judicial
function which courts are qualified to exercise").
168. See 105 S. Ct. at 1658.
169. A pattern of enforcement or nonenforcement based upon discrimination of a protected
class would obviously run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), where the Supreme Court observed of the San
Francisco Board of Supervisors Administration of a zoning ordinance,
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is
applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand,
so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in simi-
lar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the
prohibition of the Constitution.
Id. at 373-74; see also Two Guys, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 588-89 (1961) (asserting that
unconstitutional discrimination to be a valid defense to discriminatory enforcement).
Similarly, a prosecutor's enforcement discretion that was deliberately used to infringe First
Amendment rights is always subject to judicial review. See, e.g., United Stats v. Falk, 479 F.2d
6161 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v.
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sibility. 7 ° The question remains whether evidence of egregious conduct or
abuse of enforcement discretion on the part of the FDA could rebut the
presumption of nonreviewability. Justice Rehnquist, apparently, would an-
swer this question in the negative. However, the long established presump-
tion of reviewability may demand judicial examination under such
circumstances. 7 ' The relative simplicity of Chaney's factual setting, which
presented no constitutional complexities and no evidence of administrative
misconduct, leaves open this question. It is doubtful that future decisions
will extend the section 701(a)(2) exception to agency enforcement decisions
that flout constitutional rights and elements of fundamental fairness.
172
V. CONCLUSION
Heckler v. Chaney creates a new presumption of judicial nonreviewability
of agency decisions to refuse enforcement actions. 173  This presumption
places all agency enforcement decisions within the narrow exception created
by section 701(a)(2) of the APA.174 Chaney purports to foreclose a rebuttal
of the new presumption by any evidence other than that found in the en-
abling statute. 175 Prior Supreme Court decisions and the constitutional de-
sign of separation of powers may demand judicial review upon evidence of
either infringement of fundamental rights or egregious administrative ac-
tion. 176 Concurring, Justice Marshall cautions against broad application of
the new presumption. 77 He and Justice Brennan suggest that the Chaney
holding should be limited largely to its facts.
178
The simplicity of Justice Rehnquist's sweeping new presumption of judi-
cial nonreviewability of enforcement decisions belies the potential inequities
of the decision. The opinion implicitly sanctions vexatious abuses of agency
enforcement discretion by foreclosing the forum of review. 179 This result is
wholly incompatible with the APA in that it is precisely this sort of abuse
Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972); 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 8, § 9:7; L. JAFFE, supra
note 69, at 376-89.
170. 105 S. Ct. at 1659.
171. See supra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
172. This is the concern of the concurring opinions of Justice Marshall. See supra notes
164-67.
173. See supra notes 136-52 and accompanying text.
174. 105 S. Ct. at 1659.
175. See supra notes 136-52 and accompanying text.
176. Id.
177. See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
178. 105 S. Ct. at 1660. "[O]ne can only hope that [the majority opinion] will come to be
understood as a relic of a particular factual setting in which the full implications of such a
presumption were neither confronted nor understood." Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
179. See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
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that Congress sought to prevent.18° Furthermore, the decision is inconsis-
tent with the enlightened edicts of prior Supreme Court decisions. It re-
mains for future decisions to define further the scope of the new
presumption; decisions that will undoubtedly limit the application of this
new gap in the scheme of balanced government authority. 181
Fortunately, the long established presumption of review remains intact.
An analysis of prior case law suggests that Chaney does little to undermine
judicial review in factual circumstances warranting judicial intervention for
the protection of fundamental rights and for the prevention of abuse of au-
thority. However, where agencies make simple administrative resource-allo-
cation decisions, absent any standards or guidelines provided by the enabling
legislation, Heckler v. Chaney serves to remove the agency decision entirely
from the ambit of judicial review.
William W. Templeton
180. "[W]hen 'enforcement' inaction alledgedly deprives citizens of statutory benefits or
exposes them to harms against which Congress has sought to provide protection, review must
be on the merits to ensure that the agency is exercising its discretion within permissible
bounds." 105 S. Ct. at 1668 (Marshall, J., concurring).
181. See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
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